Globalisation: Two Routes — Vietnam & Brexit | A-Level Econ Case Studies

To globalise
or not to deglobalise.

That is the question. Vietnam integrated in; the UK partially integrated out. To analyse, we can use the same theories of comparative advantage, trade creation/diversion, sovereignty vs efficiency, just pointing in opposite directions. Click any stat below to see an AO4 point.

01

The dossiers

Vietnam

Đổi Mới → export superpower

Integration case · 1986–present
Poverty rate, 1990s → today 70%+ → <5%
Evaluation: shows trade liberalisation + FDI can drive absolute poverty reduction at a scale rarely matched — strong evidence against “globalisation only benefits the already-rich” line of argument.
Key trade agreements WTO ’07, CPTPP ’18, EVFTA ’20
Evaluation: sequenced liberalisation (not a single “big bang”) — useful counter to essays that treat globalisation as one uniform event rather than a policy choice made in stages.
FDI concentration risk Samsung ≈ ~20% of exports
Evaluation: classic “export-led growth” trade-off — growth is fast but fragile; a single MNC relocating (e.g. to India) would be a major negative supply/demand shock. Good for a 25-mark evaluation paragraph on over-reliance.
“China+1” tariff exposure Flagged in US 2024–25 tariff actions
Evaluation: being a transshipment hub for Chinese goods brings growth but geopolitical risk — protectionism elsewhere (US Section 301-style tariffs) can undo gains from opening up. Ties globalisation to trade policy uncertainty.
United Kingdom

Brexit → partial de-integration

Reversal case · 2016–present
OBR long-run GDP estimate ≈ −4% vs EU membership
Evaluation: mainly driven by reduced trade intensity, not a one-off shock — illustrates the dynamic/long-run cost of trade barriers (lower productivity growth) vs static, one-off effects usually taught first.
Post-exit trade strategy CPTPP accession, 2023
Evaluation: trade diversion vs trade creation in real time — UK swaps proximity-based EU trade for a smaller, distant CPTPP bloc. Good synoptic link: Vietnam is a founding CPTPP member, so the two case studies literally intersect.
Non-tariff barriers Rules of origin, customs
Evaluation: shows tariffs aren’t the only trade cost — NTBs are “invisible” but raise effective trade costs similarly, useful for challenging simplistic tariff-only diagrams in an essay.
The sovereignty trade-off Regulatory control vs market access
Evaluation: measured GDP losses may not capture non-pecuniary gains (state aid flexibility, immigration control) — a normative judgement examiners reward when flagged explicitly as unmeasured in GDP.
tap a row to expand the evaluation point
02

Head-to-head

DimensionVietnamUK / Brexit
DirectionIntegrating inPartially integrating out
Primary driverFDI-led export manufacturingRegulatory sovereignty
Growth effect+ large, sustained (avg. GDP growth ~6–7%/yr since 2000s)− estimated (~4% long-run GDP, OBR)
Inequality effectFalling absolute poverty, rising regional inequality (coast vs interior)Contested — regional divides pre-date Brexit, may be deepened by lost EU structural funds
Main riskOver-concentration in few MNCs / sectorsNon-tariff barriers reducing SME export viability
Trade theory linkTrade creation via new FTAs (CPTPP, EVFTA)Trade diversion away from EU toward smaller/distant partners
03

A* takeaways

01

Trade creation vs trade diversion, applied both ways

Vietnam’s new FTAs mostly create trade (new, more efficient flows). The UK leaving the EU mostly diverts it (from an efficient nearby partner to smaller distant ones). Same concept, opposite direction — examiners reward spotting this symmetry.

Apply to: 25-mark essay on costs/benefits of trade agreements
02

Static costs vs dynamic, long-run effects

Don’t stop at the one-off tariff/NTB cost. Vietnam’s gains and the UK’s OBR-estimated losses are mostly dynamic — productivity, investment, and FDI effects that compound over decades, not a single S-D shift.

Apply to: evaluating “the impact of trade liberalisation on growth”
03

Concentration risk is the flip side of FDI-led growth

Export-led growth via a handful of MNCs (Samsung in Vietnam) buys rapid growth but imports fragility. Use this to challenge any essay that treats “more FDI” as an unambiguous good.

Apply to: evaluating supply-side/FDI-attraction policies
04

GDP doesn’t capture everything traded away

The UK’s sovereignty gains (state aid flexibility, independent trade/immigration policy) sit outside GDP. Explicitly flagging what a headline stat omits is a reliable route to AO4 evaluation marks.

Apply to: any question using GDP as a sole measure of “success”
05

Globalisation is a policy choice, not a single event

Vietnam’s Đổi Mới was sequenced over decades (WTO 2007, CPTPP 2018, EVFTA 2020). Treating “globalisation” as one uniform, irreversible force is a common weak-answer trap — both cases show it’s a series of reversible policy decisions.

Apply to: define/discuss questions on globalisation itself
06

The synoptic link: CPTPP

Vietnam (founding member, 2018) and the UK (joined 2023) sit in the same trade bloc from opposite starting points — one of the few real-world links that ties two otherwise unconnected case studies together in a single answer.

Apply to: comparative/synoptic questions spanning two countries
compiled for tutoring use · figures approximate, verify against latest ONS / OBR / World Bank data before exams